The Unanswered Questions and the Poisoned Arrow 十四無記與箭喻
Is the world eternal? Is the soul the same as the body? Does an awakened person exist after death? The Buddha refused to answer, and compared the questioner to a man shot with a poisoned arrow who will not let the surgeon remove it until he knows who shot him. This lesson sets that refusal beside Kant’s questions that reason “cannot decline” and “cannot answer,” William James’ pragmatic method, and Wittgenstein’s ladder, and asks what kind of silence it was. 世界是永恆的嗎？靈魂與身體是同一個嗎？覺悟的人死後還存在嗎？佛陀拒絕回答；他把發問的人比作一個中了毒箭的人：在知道是誰射他之前，不讓醫生把箭拔出來。這一課把這個拒絕，跟康德那些理性「無法推辭」又「無法回答」的問題、威廉・詹姆斯的實用主義方法，以及維根斯坦的梯子並列，並且問：那是哪一種沉默？
D21 Dharma and the West · 佛法與西方哲學Knowledge and Logic · 知識與邏輯Advanced · 高級about 30 min
無記・箭喻
avyākata Pāli avyākṛta Sanskritthe undeclared questions; the simile of the arrow
The verdict · 判定
Closest: William James, whose pragmatic method asks of every metaphysical dispute what practical difference the answer would make, and calls the dispute idle if there is none. The arrow makes the same move. The likeness ends at two points. James thought a dispute with no practical difference was empty, while the Buddha said these questions do positive harm, “a thicket of views,” bound up with clinging to a self. And the Buddha did not leave a gap where the answers would be. He put the four noble truths there, the teaching he did declare, because it leads to release.
中文翻譯Every paragraph has a Chinese translation. Tap 中譯▾ under a paragraph to open that one, or use Show Chinese · 顯示中譯 at the top to open them all.每一段都有中譯：點段落下方的「中譯」只開那一段，或按上方的「顯示中譯」一次全部打開。
1 · What the Dharma says · 佛法怎麼說
Questions set aside 被擱置的問題
The Pali discourses list ten questions the Buddha “left undeclared; he has set them aside and turned them down.” In Bhikkhu Sujato’s translation: “the cosmos is eternal, or not eternal, or finite, or infinite; the soul and the body are one and the same, or the soul is one thing, the body another; after death, a realized one still exists, or no longer exists, or both still exists and no longer exists, or neither still exists nor no longer exists” (Majjhima Nikāya 63). Later Sanskrit and Chinese works count fourteen by giving each of the first two questions four corners. The Treatise on the Great Perfection of Wisdom lists the “fourteen difficult questions” and reports a critic’s inference: since the Buddha did not answer them, he cannot have been omniscient.
The famous answer is a simile. The monk Māluṅkyaputta threatens to leave the order unless the Buddha tells him whether the cosmos is eternal. The Buddha replies: “Suppose a man was struck by an arrow thickly smeared with poison. His friends and colleagues, relatives and kin would get a surgeon to treat him. But the man would say: ‘I won’t extract this arrow as long as I don’t know whether the man who wounded me was an aristocrat, a brahmin, a peasant, or a menial.’” He goes on to demand the archer’s name and clan, his height and complexion, his village, and whether the bow was straight or recurved. “That man would still not have learned these things, and meanwhile they’d die.” The Chinese version lists even more: the wood of the bow, the sinew of its string, the feathers of the arrow, and the smith who forged its head.
Then the Buddha gives his reason, and the reason is the heart of the lesson. “And why haven’t I declared these things? Because they aren’t beneficial or relevant to the fundamentals of the spiritual life. They don’t lead to disillusionment, dispassion, cessation, peace, insight, awakening, and extinguishment.” And what has he declared? Suffering, its origin, its cessation, and the path. Those he declared because they do lead there. The Great Perfection of Wisdom adds a second reason. “Because these things have no reality, he does not answer.” It is like asking how many pints of milk can be got by milking a cow’s horn: “this is not a real question, and should not be answered.” One reason is practical and the other concerns the question itself. The Buddha’s silence has both.
The Critique of Pure Reason opens, in J. M. D. Meiklejohn’s translation, with a sentence that could stand beside Māluṅkyaputta’s demand. “Human reason, in one sphere of its cognition, is called upon to consider questions, which it cannot decline, as they are presented by its own nature, but which it cannot answer, as they transcend every faculty of the mind.” Kant’s list overlaps the Buddha’s closely: whether the world has a beginning, whether it is finite, whether the soul is simple and survives. He also diagnosed the cause. Reason rises from principles that work in experience to principles that transcend it, and “the arena of these endless contests is called Metaphysic.” The lesson on the four corners showed how Kant dissolved these questions. Here the point is his explanation of why people cannot stop asking them. The Buddha’s monk was not idle. He was doing what Kant says reason does by its nature. Kant’s cure was a critique of reason. The Buddha’s was to turn attention to the arrow.
《純粹理性批判》的開頭（J. M. D. Meiklejohn 的英譯），有一句可以跟鬘童子的要求並列的話：「人類理性在它認識的某一個領域裡，被召喚去考慮一些問題；這些問題它無法推辭，因為它們是由理性自己的本性提出來的；它卻也無法回答，因為它們超出了心的一切能力。」康德的清單跟佛陀的高度重疊：世界有沒有開端、是不是有限、靈魂是不是單純而且死後仍存。他也診斷了原因：理性從在經驗中有效的原理，上升到超出經驗的原理；「這些無盡爭鬥的戰場，就叫做形上學」。講「四句」的那一課，顯示了康德怎麼消解這些問題。這裡的重點，是他解釋了人為什麼停不下來問。佛陀的那位比丘並不是無所事事；他做的正是康德所說理性依其本性會做的事。康德的對治是理性的批判；佛陀的對治，是把注意力轉向那支箭。
In Pragmatism William James proposed a method for exactly these disputes. “The pragmatic method is primarily a method of settling metaphysical disputes that otherwise might be interminable. Is the world one or many?—fated or free?—material or spiritual?” The method is to ask, “What difference would it practically make to anyone if this notion rather than that notion were true? If no practical difference whatever can be traced, then the alternatives mean practically the same thing, and all dispute is idle.” This is the arrow in the language of an American philosopher, and the comparison is often made. There is a difference in what the test finds. For James, a dispute without practical consequences is empty, and the two sides “mean practically the same thing.” The Buddha did not say that “the cosmos is eternal” and “the cosmos is not eternal” mean the same. He said that holding either one keeps a person tangled in views and clinging. James finds the questions idle, and the Buddha finds them harmful.
The Tractatus ends with a silence that readers have often compared to the Buddha’s. In C. K. Ogden’s translation: “We feel that even if all possible scientific questions be answered, the problems of life have still not been touched at all.” And: “The solution of the problem of life is seen in the vanishing of this problem.” Then the book calls its own propositions a ladder: “He must so to speak throw away the ladder, after he has climbed up on it.” And the last line: “Whereof one cannot speak, thereof one must be silent.” Two things here are close to the Buddha. Answers to theoretical questions leave the problem of life untouched, which is the arrow again, and the deepest questions are resolved when they vanish, not when they are answered. The difference is in the tone of the silence. Wittgenstein’s silence surrounds what he called the mystical, something that shows itself but cannot be said. The Buddha’s silence on the ten questions is practical, a doctor’s refusal to discuss the archer, and he spoke at length about the path.
《邏輯哲學論》以一種沉默結束；讀者常把它與佛陀的沉默相比。C. K. Ogden 的英譯是：「我們覺得，即使一切可能的科學問題都得到了回答，人生的問題仍然完全沒有被觸及。」以及：「人生問題的解答，在於這個問題的消失。」接著這本書把它自己的命題稱為梯子：「可以說，他必須在爬上梯子之後，把梯子丟掉。」最後一句是：「對於不能說的，必須保持沉默。」這裡有兩點接近佛陀。對理論問題的回答，讓人生的問題原封未動，這又是那支箭；最深的問題是在消失時被解決的，而不是在被回答時。差別在於沉默的基調。維根斯坦的沉默，環繞著他所謂的神祕之物：那種顯示自己、卻無法被說出的東西。佛陀對這十個問題的沉默是實際的，是醫生拒絕討論射箭的人；而他對於道路說了很多。
4 · Verdict · 判定
Who is closest, and where the likeness ends 誰最接近，相似到哪裡為止
The closest is William James. His test, what practical difference an answer would make, is the arrow turned into a method, and he applied it to nearly the same questions. Kant is closest on why the questions arise and keep arising, since reason asks them by its own nature. Wittgenstein is closest on the relation between theory and life: answer every theoretical question and “the problems of life have still not been touched at all.”
The likeness ends at two points. First, the Buddha’s judgment on the questions is stronger than James’. They are not merely idle. Each answer is a view that a person holds on to, and holding on to views is one of the four kinds of clinging. The Great Perfection of Wisdom says that answering them brings no benefit and some loss, and leads into wrong views. Second, the Buddha’s silence has a definite content beside it. He did not say that nothing can be said, as the end of the Tractatus seems to. He said that these things are undeclared and the four truths are declared, and he asked his students to remember which was which. The silence is a teacher’s judgment about what to teach, and it is not a mystic’s judgment about the limits of language.
They have no reality, like milking a horn它們沒有實在；像擠牛角
They transcend experience它們超出經驗
No practical difference沒有實際的差別
They cannot be said它們無法被說
Are the questions harmful?這些問題有害嗎？
Yes, a thicket of views是；見稠林
Yes, no benefit and some loss是；無利有失
They breed endless contests它們引起無盡的爭鬥
Merely idle只是空轉
They are nonsense它們是無意義的
What is put in their place以什麼取代它們
The four noble truths四聖諦
The true character of things諸法實相
A critique of reason, and practical faith理性的批判，與實踐的信念
Inquiry into consequences對後果的探究
Silence, and seeing the world rightly沉默，以及正確地看世界
Purpose目的
To remove the arrow把箭拔出來
To defend the Buddha’s omniscience護衛佛的一切智
To end metaphysical warfare結束形上學的戰爭
To make philosophy useful讓哲學有用
To show the limits of language顯示語言的界限
5 · The step the Dharma takes further · 佛法多走的一步
The views as clinging, and Vimalakīrti’s silence 見解作為執取，以及維摩詰的默然
The first further step is the diagnosis of why the questions grip us. Kant blamed the nature of reason, and James blamed bad method. The Buddha located the grip in the self. Look at the list again. Is the cosmos eternal? Is the soul the same as the body? What happens to a realized one after death? Each question is, underneath, a question about what will become of me, asked by someone who takes himself to be a lasting self. That is why the answers are not merely idle. They feed the clinging that the arrow stands for. In Majjhima Nikāya 72, when the wanderer Vaccha asks whether the Buddha holds any view at all, the reply is that a realized one “has done away with convictions,” because he has seen the rise and fall of form, feeling, perception, choices, and consciousness. When there is no self to protect, the questions lose their urgency.
The second step is that Mahāyāna gave silence a new meaning. In the Vimalakīrti Sūtra, a gathering of bodhisattvas each explain how one enters the Dharma gate of nonduality. Mañjuśrī says that it is beyond words and speech, beyond questions and answers. Then he asks Vimalakīrti, who says nothing. In Kumārajīva’s translation, “Vimalakīrti was silent and spoke no word. Mañjuśrī praised him: ‘Excellent, excellent! To have no letters and no words at all, this is truly entering the gate of nonduality.’” This silence is closer to Wittgenstein’s than the Buddha’s silence before Māluṅkyaputta was. It shows what cannot be said. A teacher should keep the two apart. The early silence concerns what not to teach because it does not help, and the later silence concerns what no teaching can contain. Both are Buddhist, and they answer different questions.
Westerners often take the Buddha’s silence in one of two wrong ways. Some think he was hiding a secret answer, usually that the self survives. Others think he was saying the questions are meaningless. Begin with the arrow, which everyone understands at once, and ask the audience what questions they would want answered before letting the surgeon work. Then give the Buddha’s reason in his own words: these questions do not lead to peace, insight, and release. Add the cow’s horn from the Great Perfection of Wisdom, to show that some of the questions are also badly formed. William James’ question, what practical difference would it make, is a good bridge for an American audience. End by saying what the Buddha did teach, because the silence makes sense only beside it.
The Buddha refused to say whether the world is eternal or what happens to an awakened person after death.
佛陀拒絕說世界是不是永恆的，也拒絕說覺悟的人死後會怎樣。
He compared the questioner to a man shot with a poisoned arrow who wants to know who shot him before it is removed.
他把發問的人比作中了毒箭的人：在箭被拔出之前，想先知道是誰射了他。
His reason: these questions do not lead to peace, insight, and release.
他的理由是：這些問題不通往寂靜、智慧與解脫。
A later text adds that some of them are like asking how much milk you can get from a cow’s horn.
後來的論典補充：其中有些問題，就像問從牛角能擠出多少乳。
William James asked the same thing of metaphysics: what practical difference would the answer make?
威廉・詹姆斯對形上學問的是同一件事：這個答案會造成什麼實際的差別？
He did not leave a blank. In place of those answers he taught suffering, its cause, its end, and the path.
他沒有留下空白。在那些答案的位置上，他教了苦、苦的原因、苦的止息，以及道路。
Phrases to avoid 要避開的說法
“The Buddha secretly believed in an eternal soul.” 「佛陀暗地裡相信一個永恆的靈魂。」
The sutta says the soul question is undeclared, and Majjhima Nikāya 72 explains why.
經文說靈魂的問題是無記的；《中部》72 解釋了為什麼。
“The Buddha thought these questions were meaningless.” 「佛陀認為這些問題沒有意義。」
His main reason was that they do not help, and they feed clinging.
他的主要理由是：它們沒有幫助，而且會餵養執取。
“Buddhism discourages thinking.” 「佛教不鼓勵思考。」
The Buddha argued constantly. He filtered what to teach, not what to think.
佛陀不斷地論證。他篩選的是該教什麼，不是該想什麼。
“Silence is the highest teaching, so say nothing.” 「沉默是最高的教法，所以什麼都別說。」
He set ten questions aside and taught the four truths at length.
他擱置了十個問題，卻詳細地教了四聖諦。
Three languages · 三語對照
The vocabulary, in Chinese, Pāli, Sanskrit, and English 術語：中文、巴利文、梵文、英文
中文
Pāli
Sanskrit
English
無記
avyākata
avyākṛta
undeclared; set aside
十四無記・十四難
—
caturdaśa avyākṛtavastūni
the fourteen undeclared questions
箭喻
—
—
the simile of the poisoned arrow
見稠林
diṭṭhigahana
dṛṣṭigahana
the thicket of views
見取
diṭṭhupādāna
dṛṣṭyupādāna
clinging to views
如來
tathāgata
tathāgata
a realized one
一切智
sabbaññutā
sarvajñatā
omniscience
不二法門
—
advaya-dharma-mukha
the Dharma gate of nonduality
實用主義
—
—
pragmatism
Reading check · 理解測驗
Did it land? 讀懂了嗎
1. What does the man shot with the poisoned arrow want to know before it is removed?
2. What reason does the Buddha give for not declaring these questions in Majjhima Nikāya 63?
3. What does the Great Perfection of Wisdom compare some of the questions to?
4. How does the Buddha’s judgment differ from William James’?
5. How does Vimalakīrti’s silence differ from the Buddha’s silence before Māluṅkyaputta?
Write · 你怎麼講？
Name a question you have spent a lot of time on that, if answered, would change nothing about how you live. Then name the arrow it may be keeping you from. About 150 words.
Apply William James’ test to one of the ten questions. What practical difference would the answer make? Then say why the Buddha would go further than James.
