Philosophers · 哲學家 · The Early Modern Age
Immanuel Kant 康德 · Immanuel Kant
A harness-maker’s son who never left his province, and who drew the limits of human knowledge and the foundation of human dignity from a single principle: that reason gives the law to itself.
一個馬具匠的兒子,一生沒有離開過他的省份;他從同一條原理——理性為自己立法——劃出了人類知識的界限,也立下了人類尊嚴的根基。
- Born 出生
- April 22, 1724, Königsberg (now Kaliningrad, Russia)
- Died 去世
- February 12, 1804, Königsberg
- Parents 父母
- Johann Georg Kant, harness-maker; Anna Regina Reuter. Devout Pietists
- Post 職位
- Professor of logic and metaphysics, University of Königsberg, from 1770
- Main works 主要著作
- Critique of Pure Reason (1781); Groundwork (1785); Critique of Practical Reason (1788); Critique of Judgment (1790)
- Wrote in 寫作語言
- German, and some Latin
中文翻譯Every paragraph has a Chinese translation. Tap 中譯▾ under a paragraph to open that one, or use Show Chinese · 顯示中譯 at the top to open them all. 每一段都有中譯:點段落下方的「中譯」只開那一段,或按上方的「顯示中譯」一次全部打開。
Life · 生平
A life in three scenes 三幕人生
The harness-maker’s son 馬具匠的兒子
Kant was born in 1724 in Königsberg, a Baltic port at the eastern edge of the German-speaking world, and he died there seventy-nine years later without ever having traveled more than a few days’ journey from it. His father made harnesses. The family belonged to the Pietists, a Lutheran movement that valued inward devotion, plain living, and strict self-examination, and Kant said in old age that no one could have had a better moral education than his parents gave him. The school the Pietists ran was another matter. He remembered its regime of prayer and drill with something like horror, and it left him with a lifelong dislike of religious enthusiasm.
康德 1724 年生於柯尼斯堡,波羅的海邊的一個港口,位於德語世界的東緣;七十九年後,他在那裡去世,一生沒有到過離它幾天路程以外的地方。他的父親是做馬具的。這家人屬於敬虔派,那是路德宗內部一個看重內在虔誠、樸素生活與嚴格自我省察的運動;康德晚年說,沒有人能得到比他父母給他的更好的道德教育。敬虔派辦的學校則是另一回事。他回想起那裡的祈禱與操練,帶著近乎恐懼的心情;那所學校讓他一輩子不喜歡宗教狂熱。
He entered the local university at sixteen and discovered Newton. When his father died he had to leave without a post, and for nine years he worked as a tutor in country houses. He returned in 1755 as an unsalaried lecturer, paid by the students who chose to attend, and he lectured for fifteen years on almost everything: logic, physics, mathematics, geography, anthropology, fortification. In those years he was known as an elegant and witty man, a good hand at billiards and cards and a sought-after dinner guest. He proposed, in a work on astronomy, that the solar system had condensed from a rotating cloud of gas, a hypothesis that is still accepted in outline.
他十六歲進了當地的大學,發現了牛頓。父親去世時,他還沒有職位就不得不離開;有九年之久,他在鄉間的大宅裡當家庭教師。1755 年他回來,當一名沒有薪水的講師,收入來自選擇來聽課的學生;他講了十五年的課,幾乎什麼都講:邏輯、物理、數學、地理、人類學、築城學。那些年裡,人們知道他是一個優雅而風趣的人,撞球與牌都打得好,是受歡迎的晚宴賓客。他在一部天文學著作裡提出:太陽系是從一團旋轉的氣體雲凝聚而成的;這個假說的大綱至今仍被接受。
The silent decade 沉默的十年
In 1770, at forty-six, he was at last given the chair of logic and metaphysics. Then he published almost nothing for eleven years. He had read David Hume, and Hume’s argument that we have no rational ground for believing in causation had, he wrote, “first interrupted my dogmatic slumber.” If Hume was right, science had no foundation. If Hume was wrong, someone had to show how the mind can know in advance of experience that every event has a cause. Kant’s friends expected a book each year, and each year he wrote that it was nearly ready. The Critique of Pure Reason appeared in 1781, eight hundred pages put on paper, by his own account, in four or five months after twelve years of thought. The first reviewers found it unreadable.
1770 年,四十六歲的他終於得到了邏輯與形上學的教席。然後,他有十一年幾乎什麼也沒發表。他讀了休謨;而休謨的論證(我們沒有理性的根據相信因果關係),他寫道,「最先打斷了我的獨斷論的迷夢」。如果休謨是對的,科學就沒有地基。如果休謨是錯的,就得有人說明:心靈怎麼能夠在經驗之前就知道每一個事件都有原因。康德的朋友們年年期待一本書,而他年年寫信說快好了。《純粹理性批判》在 1781 年問世;八百頁,照他自己的說法,是在十二年的思考之後,用四五個月寫到紙上的。最早的書評者覺得它根本讀不下去。
He was fifty-seven, and the works that made him the central figure of modern philosophy were all still to come. They followed within a decade: the Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals in 1785, a second edition of the first Critique in 1787, the Critique of Practical Reason in 1788, and the Critique of Judgment in 1790.
那年他五十七歲;而使他成為近代哲學核心人物的那些著作,全都還沒寫出來。它們在十年之內接連問世:1785 年的《道德形上學基礎》、1787 年的第一批判第二版、1788 年的《實踐理性批判》,以及 1790 年的《判斷力批判》。
The clock of Königsberg 柯尼斯堡的時鐘
By then his life had taken the fixed form for which he is remembered. He rose at five, drank tea, smoked one pipe, lectured from seven, wrote until one, and dined at length with guests chosen from outside the university, since he disliked talking philosophy at table. At half past three he walked, alone and breathing through his nose, and it is said that his neighbors set their clocks by him. The one recorded lapse came when he was reading Rousseau’s Emile and could not put it down. Rousseau’s portrait hung in his study, the only picture in the house. It was Rousseau, he wrote, who had cured him of despising the ignorant and taught him to honor human beings.
到那時候,他的生活已經定型成後人記得的那個樣子。他五點起床,喝茶,抽一斗菸,七點開始講課,寫作到一點,然後跟賓客慢慢吃一頓午餐;賓客是從大學以外挑的,因為他不喜歡在餐桌上談哲學。三點半他去散步,一個人,用鼻子呼吸;據說他的鄰居靠他來對時。有紀錄的唯一一次失常,是他在讀盧梭的《愛彌兒》,放不下來。盧梭的肖像掛在他的書房裡,是屋子裡唯一的一幅畫。他寫道,是盧梭治好了他對無知者的輕視,教會了他尊重人。
He welcomed the American and French revolutions and went on defending the principles of the second after the Terror had turned most of his countrymen against it. In 1794 his book on religion brought a rebuke from the Prussian king and an order to write no more on the subject, which he obeyed until the king died. His mind began to fail in his last years. He died on February 12, 1804. His last words, on being given a little wine and water, were “It is good.” The city turned out for the funeral.
他歡迎美國與法國的革命;在恐怖統治使他大多數的同胞轉而反對後者之後,他仍然繼續為它的原則辯護。1794 年,他談宗教的那本書招來了普魯士國王的申斥,以及一道不准再寫這個題目的命令;他遵守到國王去世為止。在最後幾年,他的心智開始衰退。1804 年 2 月 12 日,他去世了。有人給了他一點摻水的酒,他最後的話是:「很好。」全城的人都出來送葬。
- 1724Born in Königsberg生於柯尼斯堡
- 1755Begins lecturing開始講課
- 1770Professor of logic and metaphysics任邏輯與形上學教授
- 1781Critique of Pure Reason《純粹理性批判》
- 1785Groundwork《道德形上學基礎》
- 1788Critique of Practical Reason《實踐理性批判》
- 1790Critique of Judgment《判斷力批判》
- 1795Toward Perpetual Peace《論永久和平》
- 1804Dies in Königsberg卒於柯尼斯堡
The central idea · 核心觀念
The mind gives the law 心靈立法
Before Kant, philosophers assumed that knowledge is the mind’s conforming to objects, and they could not explain how we know anything about objects in advance, as we seem to in mathematics and in the principle that every event has a cause. Kant proposed to try the opposite assumption. Copernicus, unable to explain the motions of the heavens while supposing that they revolve around the spectator, tried “looking for the observed movements not in the heavenly bodies, but in the spectator.” Suppose, likewise, that objects conform to our way of knowing. Space, time, and causation are then the forms that the mind brings to experience. We can know in advance that everything we meet will be in space and time and subject to causal law, because nothing could be an experience for us otherwise. The price is that we know things only as they appear to beings like us. What they are in themselves we cannot know. Both halves are needed: “Thoughts without content are void; intuitions without conceptions, blind.”
在康德之前,哲學家預設知識是心靈去符合對象;而他們無法解釋,我們怎麼能預先知道關於對象的任何事,就像我們在數學裡、以及在「每一個事件都有原因」這條原理上似乎做到的那樣。康德提議試試相反的預設。哥白尼假定天體繞著觀察者轉的時候,解釋不了天體的運動;於是他試著「不在天體那裡、而在觀察者這裡,去尋找所觀察到的運動」。同樣地,假設是對象來符合我們認識的方式。那麼,空間、時間與因果,就是心靈帶給經驗的形式。我們可以預先知道,我們遇到的一切都會在空間與時間之中,並且服從因果法則;因為若不如此,就沒有任何東西能成為我們的經驗。代價是:我們只認識事物對「像我們這樣的存在者」顯現的樣子。它們本身是什麼,我們無從得知。兩半都少不了:「思想無內容是空的,直觀無概念是盲的。」
The same move governs his ethics. The moral law is not handed to us by God, nature, or society. A rational being gives it to itself, and Kant’s word for this is autonomy, self-legislation. To act morally is to act on a principle that one can will as a law for all rational beings, and to be capable of this is to have a worth that nothing can be traded for. Things have a price. Persons have dignity. Near the end of the second Critique he set the two halves of his philosophy side by side, in the sentence that was later cut on his tomb: “Two things fill the mind with ever new and increasing admiration and awe, the oftener and the more steadily we reflect on them: the starry heavens above and the moral law within.”
同樣的一步,支配著他的倫理學。道德法則不是上帝、自然或社會交給我們的。一個理性的存在者把它交給自己;康德用來稱呼這件事的詞是「自律」,自我立法。合乎道德地行動,就是依照一條自己能夠意願成為一切理性存在者之法則的原則去行動;而有能力這樣做,就擁有了一種什麼也換不走的價值。物有價格。人有尊嚴。在第二批判接近結尾的地方,他把自己哲學的兩半並排放在一起,那句話後來被刻在他的墓上:「有兩樣東西,我們越是經常、越是持續地反省它們,它們就越是以常新而且不斷增長的讚嘆與敬畏充滿心靈:我頭上的星空,與我心中的道德法則。」
Two things fill the mind with ever new and increasing admiration and awe, the oftener and the more steadily we reflect on them: the starry heavens above and the moral law within.有兩樣東西,我們越是經常、越是持續地反省它們,它們就越是以常新而且不斷增長的讚嘆與敬畏充滿心靈:我頭上的星空,與我心中的道德法則。
The first shows us how small we are as animals. The second shows what we are worth as persons. 前者讓我們看到,作為動物,我們多麼渺小。後者讓我們看到,作為人格,我們價值幾何。
The strongest objection · 最強的反駁
Rigor without eyes 沒有眼睛的嚴格
The charge made in his own lifetime was that the theory is too rigid to live by. When Benjamin Constant asked whether one must tell the truth to a murderer seeking one’s friend, Kant answered that one must, and the essay in which he said so has embarrassed his admirers for two hundred years. Hegel pressed a deeper version. The test of universal law, he argued, is empty. It can show that a maxim is consistent, and almost any maxim can be made consistent if it is described carefully. The real content of morality comes from the customs and institutions of an actual community, and Kant has mistaken the form of morality for its source. A third criticism comes from Aristotle’s side. A person who visits a sick friend because duty requires it has, most of us feel, missed something that the friend who comes out of affection has not.
在他有生之年就有人提出的指控是:這個理論太僵硬,沒辦法照著過日子。貢斯當問:對一個正在找你朋友的兇手,是否也必須說實話?康德回答:必須;而他說這話的那篇文章,讓他的仰慕者難堪了兩百年。黑格爾提出了一個更深的版本。他論證:普遍法則的檢驗是空的。它能顯示一條準則是否前後一致;而幾乎任何準則,只要小心地描述,都可以弄得前後一致。道德真正的內容,來自一個實際共同體的習俗與制度;康德把道德的形式誤當成了它的來源。第三個批評來自亞里斯多德那一邊。一個因為義務要求而去探望生病朋友的人,我們多數人都覺得,他錯過了那位出於情誼而來的朋友沒有錯過的某個東西。
A different objection has become prominent in recent decades. The philosopher of universal human dignity also lectured for years on anthropology and physical geography, and in those lectures and some essays he ranked the peoples of the world in a hierarchy of races with Europeans at the top. In his later political writings he condemned colonial conquest and slavery. Scholars disagree about whether he changed his mind or held both views at once. Either way, his case shows how a thinker can state a principle that condemns his own prejudice and fail for most of his life to apply it.
近幾十年來,另一個反駁變得突出。這位講「普遍的人類尊嚴」的哲學家,也講了多年的人類學與自然地理學;在那些講課與某些文章裡,他把世界上的各個民族排成一個種族的等級,歐洲人在最上面。在後期的政治著作裡,他譴責了殖民征服與奴隸制。學者們對於他是改變了想法、還是同時抱持兩種看法,意見分歧。不管是哪一種,他的例子都顯示:一個思想者可以說出一條譴責他自己偏見的原則,卻在大半生當中沒有去運用它。
How we know · 史料
The man behind the clock 時鐘背後的人
The Kant of legend, a thinking machine who never altered his walk, comes mostly from three memoirs published by acquaintances in the year of his death, which describe the routines of a man over sixty, and from a brilliant page of the poet Heinrich Heine, written thirty years later, which says that he had neither life nor history. The record of his first forty-five years is thinner and shows someone else: a popular lecturer who was told by a friend that he spent too much time at dinners and card tables to write the books he was capable of. The regularity was adopted in middle age, on the advice of an English merchant friend, by a man with a weak chest who had decided that he had work to finish.
傳說中的康德,是一台從不改變散步路線的思考機器;這個形象主要來自他去世那年三位熟人出版的回憶錄(它們描述的是一個六十多歲的人的作息),以及詩人海涅三十年後寫下的精彩的一頁,那一頁說他既沒有生活、也沒有歷史。關於他前四十五年的紀錄比較單薄,呈現的卻是另一個人:一位受歡迎的講師,有朋友告訴他,他花太多時間在晚宴與牌桌上,寫不出他有能力寫的書。那份規律是中年才採取的,出於一位英國商人朋友的建議;採取它的,是一個胸腔虛弱、並且認定自己有工作要完成的人。
His books raise a different problem of access. He wrote in a technical vocabulary that he largely invented, and he revised his central work so heavily for its second edition that scholars cite the two by letter, A and B, and still argue about which represents his real view. He knew that he was hard to read and said that the fault lay in the subject.
他的書帶來的,是另一種「怎麼進得去」的問題。他用一套大體上是自己發明的術語寫作;而他為了第二版,把自己的核心著作改得太多,以致學者用字母 A 與 B 分別引用兩個版本,並且至今仍在爭論哪一個代表他真正的看法。他知道自己難讀;他說,錯在題材。
Dharma and the West · 佛法與西方哲學
Kant and the Buddha 康德與佛陀
The closest meeting is over the questions that cannot be answered. The Buddha was asked whether the world is eternal or not, finite or infinite, and whether the soul is the same as the body or different, and he set the questions aside as undetermined. Kant’s first Critique contains a section called the Antinomies, in which he takes the same questions, whether the world has a beginning in time and a limit in space, and proves both the yes and the no with equal rigor. His conclusion is that reason contradicts itself when it tries to speak of the world as a whole, because it has gone beyond any possible experience. The two give different reasons for the silence. The Buddha says that the questions do not lead to the end of suffering. Kant says that the human mind is not equipped to settle them. The Indian philosopher T. R. V. Murti argued in 1955 that the Madhyamaka school’s method, which shows that every view about ultimate reality leads to contradiction, is the nearest thing in world philosophy to Kant’s critique.
兩人最接近的交會,是在那些無法回答的問題上。有人問佛陀:世界是永恆的還是不永恆的?有邊的還是無邊的?命(靈魂)與身體是同一個還是不同的?他把這些問題擱置為「無記」。康德的第一批判裡有一節叫作「二律背反」;他在那裡拿了同樣的問題(世界在時間上有沒有開端、在空間上有沒有界限),並且以同等的嚴格,把「有」與「沒有」都證明了出來。他的結論是:理性一旦試圖談論作為整體的世界,就會自相矛盾,因為它已經越出了任何可能的經驗。兩人對這份沉默給的理由不同。佛陀說,這些問題不導向苦的止息。康德說,人類的心靈沒有配備去解決它們。印度哲學家穆諦在 1955 年論證:中觀學派的方法(顯示關於究竟真實的每一種見解都會導致矛盾),是世界哲學當中最接近康德的「批判」的東西。
Kant’s distinction between things as they appear and things in themselves has often been set beside the Buddhist two truths, and the comparison needs care. For Kant there is a reality behind appearances that we cannot reach. For Nāgārjuna there is nothing hidden behind the conventional world, and the ultimate truth is the emptiness of that very world. In ethics the two share a universal scope and part over the role of feeling. Kant distrusts inclination and locates moral worth in duty done against it. The Buddhist path is a training of inclination, so that kindness is finally what one wants to do. And Kant holds that morality needs a free and responsible self as its postulate, which is a place where the teaching of not-self would press him hard (Dharma and the West, D10 and D21).
康德對「顯現的事物」與「物自身」的區分,常被拿來跟佛教的二諦並列;這個比較需要小心。對康德來說,在現象背後有一個我們到不了的實在。對龍樹來說,世俗的世界背後並沒有藏著什麼;勝義諦,就是這個世界本身的空。在倫理學上,兩者共有普遍的範圍,卻在情感的角色上分道揚鑣。康德不信任愛好,並且把道德價值放在違逆愛好而履行的義務上。佛教的道,則是對愛好的一種訓練,使仁慈最終成為一個人「想要」做的事。還有,康德主張道德需要一個自由而負責的自我作為它的設準;在這個地方,無我的教導會對他步步進逼(佛法與西方哲學 D10、D21)。
Terms of art · 哲學術語
Words that come with him 跟著他一起來的詞
L. ‘from what is earlier’
Known independently of experience, as against a posteriori, known from it.
獨立於經驗而被知道的;相對於 a posteriori(後天的),即由經驗而知的。
Gk. phainomenon ‘what appears’; nooumenon ‘what is thought’
A thing as it appears to us, and the thing as it is in itself.
事物對我們顯現的樣子,以及事物本身的樣子。
L. transcendere ‘to climb beyond’
Concerned with the conditions that make experience possible.
關乎使經驗成為可能的那些條件。
Gk. autos ‘self’ + nomos ‘law’
Giving the moral law to oneself through reason. Its opposite is heteronomy, taking the law from outside.
透過理性為自己立下道德法則。它的反面是他律,即從外面接受法則。
Gk. anti ‘against’ + nomos ‘law’
A pair of contradictory claims each of which can apparently be proved.
一對互相矛盾的主張,兩者看來都可以被證明。
L. dignitas ‘worth’; Ger. Würde
The worth of a person, which is beyond all price and admits no equivalent.
人格的價值;它超乎一切價格,沒有等價物。
Reading check · 理解測驗
Did it land? 讀懂了嗎
1. What is Kant’s “Copernican” move?
2. What does autonomy mean in his ethics?
3. What was Hegel’s objection?
Go further · 延伸
Where he appears 他出現在哪幾課
- Kant, Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysic of Morals, translated by T. K. Abbott ↗The place to begin. 從這裡開始。
- Kant, “An Answer to the Question: What Is Enlightenment?” (1784)Six pages. His most readable piece. 六頁。他最好讀的一篇。
- Kant, Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics ↗His own short guide to the first Critique. 他自己為第一批判寫的簡短導讀。
- Manfred Kuehn, Kant: A Biography (2001)The life that corrects the legend. 一部修正了傳說的傳記。
- Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, “Immanuel Kant” ↗