A9 · Reality 真實
Is It Still the Same Ship? 這還是同一艘船嗎?
The Ship of Theseus: what it takes for a thing to remain itself while every part of it is replaced.
特修斯之船:一樣東西的每個部分都被換掉了,要憑什麼才算仍然是它自己?
Sameness through change can be grounded in matter, in form, in history, or in our own ways of counting. The four give different answers, and each of them breaks down in some case.
「變化中的同一」可以建立在材料上、形式上、歷史上,或建立在我們自己計數的方式上。這四者給出不同的答案,而每一個都會在某個情況下失靈。
中文翻譯Every paragraph has a Chinese translation. Tap 中譯▾ under a paragraph to open that one, or use Show Chinese · 顯示中譯 at the top to open them all. 每一段都有中譯:點段落下方的「中譯」只開那一段,或按上方的「顯示中譯」一次全部打開。
The essay · 課文
Is It Still the Same Ship? 這還是同一艘船嗎?
01A ship in the harbor 港裡的一艘船
With this lesson the subject changes. The last unit asked what we can know. This one asks what there is and what it is like, which is the business of metaphysics, and it begins with a boat. The Athenians believed that they still possessed the ship in which their hero Theseus had sailed back from Crete after killing the Minotaur. Plutarch, writing around 100 CE, reports that it “was preserved by the Athenians down even to the time of Demetrius Phalereus, for they took away the old planks as they decayed, putting in new and stronger timber in their place, insomuch that this ship became a standing example among the philosophers, for the logical question as to things that grow; one side holding that the ship remained the same, and the other contending that it was not the same.”
從這一課開始,主題換了。上一個單元問的是我們能知道什麼。這個單元問的是:有什麼東西存在、它們是什麼樣子;這是形上學的工作,而它從一艘船開始。雅典人相信,他們仍然保有英雄特修斯殺死米諾陶之後從克里特航行回來的那艘船。普魯塔克大約在西元 100 年寫道,這艘船「被雅典人保存下來,一直到德米特里・法勒魯姆的時代;因為舊木板一朽壞,他們就拆掉,換上新的、更堅固的木料;以致於這艘船在哲學家當中成了一個現成的例子,用來討論關於『會生長的東西』的邏輯問題:一方主張船還是同一艘,另一方堅稱它已經不是同一艘了。」
02Two confident answers 兩個有把握的答案
Both sides have a case. Those who say it is the same ship can point out that there was never a day on which Athens had no ship of Theseus. A single plank was changed, and the ship with one new plank was surely the ship that had been there the day before. The next repair was no different. If the ship survives each step, it survives all of them. Those who say it is not the same can point to the result. Not one splinter that Theseus touched is left. A thing made wholly of timber he never saw can be a faithful replica of his ship, and a replica is a different thing from the original.
雙方都有道理。主張是同一艘船的人可以指出:雅典從來沒有哪一天是沒有特修斯之船的。換掉了一塊木板,而換了一塊新木板的船,當然就是前一天在那裡的那艘船。下一次修補也沒有什麼不同。如果這艘船撐得過每一步,它就撐得過全部的步驟。主張不是同一艘的人可以指著結果說:特修斯碰過的木頭,連一根碎片都不剩。一個完全用他從沒見過的木料做成的東西,可以是他那艘船的忠實複製品,而複製品跟原物是兩樣東西。
03Hobbes makes it worse 霍布斯把事情弄得更糟
In 1655 Thomas Hobbes added a twist that turned an old puzzle into a hard one. Suppose that someone had kept the old planks as they were taken out, and afterward put them together again in the same order. Now there are two ships. One stands in the harbor, where the ship of Theseus has always stood, and it grew out of the original by gradual repair. The other stands in a warehouse, and it is made of exactly the planks that Theseus sailed on, arranged as they were. Each has a strong claim to be the original. They cannot both be, since one ship cannot be in two places. And it seems arbitrary to say that neither is.
1655 年,霍布斯加了一個轉折,把一個古老的謎題變成了一個難題。假設有人把舊木板在拆下來的時候都留著,事後再照原來的次序把它們組起來。現在有兩艘船了。一艘停在港裡,就在特修斯之船一向停泊的地方,它是由原船經過逐步修補而來的。另一艘在倉庫裡,它恰恰是用特修斯航行時的那些木板、照原樣排列做成的。兩艘都有很強的理由自稱是原船。它們不可能都是,因為一艘船不可能在兩個地方。而說兩艘都不是,又似乎很武斷。
04What “same” means 「同一」是什麼意思
Some care with words is needed first. Two coins from the same mint are the same in one sense, since they are exactly alike, and are plainly two coins. Philosophers call that qualitative identity. The puzzle concerns the other sense, numerical identity, being one and the same thing. The repaired ship and the original are certainly not alike in every respect. The question is whether they are one thing or two. Numerical identity obeys a strict logic. If A is the same thing as B, and B is the same thing as C, then A is the same thing as C. That is why Hobbes’s version hurts. If the ship in the harbor is the original, and the ship in the warehouse is the original, then the two are one ship, which is absurd.
首先得在用詞上小心一點。同一個鑄幣廠出來的兩枚硬幣,在某個意義上是「一樣的」,因為它們一模一樣,但明明是兩枚硬幣。哲學家把那稱為「質的同一」。這個謎題關心的是另一個意思:「數的同一」,也就是「是同一個東西」。修補過的船與原船,肯定不是在每個方面都一樣。問題是:它們是一個東西,還是兩個?數的同一遵守嚴格的邏輯。如果 A 與 B 是同一個東西,B 與 C 是同一個東西,那麼 A 與 C 就是同一個東西。這就是霍布斯的版本讓人難受的原因:如果港裡的船是原船,倉庫裡的船也是原船,那麼這兩艘就是一艘船,而這是荒謬的。
05Four ways out 四條出路
The first answer says that a thing is its matter. On this view the warehouse ship is the original, and the harbor ship is a new vessel that came into being plank by plank. Strictly applied, the view implies that nothing survives the loss of a single part, so that you are not the person who began reading this sentence. Few can live with that. The second answer says that a thing is its form and its continuous history. Aristotle held that what makes a ship a ship is its organization, and Locke made the same point about living things: “their identity depends not on a mass of the same particles, but on something else,” so that an oak is the same plant from seedling to great tree “as long as it partakes of the same life.” On this view the harbor ship wins.
第一個答案說,一樣東西就是它的材料。照這個看法,倉庫裡的船才是原船,港裡的船是一塊木板一塊木板逐漸形成的新船。嚴格應用的話,這個看法蘊涵:任何東西只要失去一個部分,就不復存在;所以你已經不是開始讀這個句子的那個人了。很少有人受得了這個結論。第二個答案說,一樣東西就是它的形式與它連續的歷史。亞里斯多德主張,使船成為船的是它的組織結構;洛克對生物提出了同樣的論點:「它們的同一性不依賴於同一堆微粒,而是依賴於別的東西」,所以一棵橡樹從幼苗長成大樹,始終是同一株植物,「只要它分有同一個生命」。照這個看法,港裡的船贏了。
The third answer changes the picture. Suppose a ship is extended in time as well as in space, a long four-dimensional thing of which each day’s ship is a slice. Then the question of which later ship is the earlier one was badly put. There are two overlapping histories that share their early stages and divide, as two roads may share a stretch of pavement. The fourth answer is the most deflating. It says that there is no further fact to discover. We know everything that happened to every plank. What remains is a decision about how to use the word “same,” and the decision properly depends on our purposes. A museum, an insurer, and a navy may each be right to count differently.
第三個答案換了一幅圖像。假設一艘船除了在空間裡延展,也在時間裡延展,是一個長長的四維的東西,每一天的船只是它的一個切片。那麼「後來的哪一艘船是先前的那一艘」這個問題,本來就問得不好。有兩段重疊的歷史,它們共用早期的階段,然後分開,就像兩條路可以共用一段路面。第四個答案最洩氣。它說,沒有進一步的事實等著被發現。每一塊木板發生了什麼,我們全都知道。剩下的是一個決定:怎麼使用「同一」這個詞;而這個決定理當取決於我們的目的。博物館、保險公司與海軍,各自用不同的算法,可以都是對的。
06A shrine and a warship 一座神宮與一艘戰艦
The puzzle is acted out in real institutions, and different cultures have settled it differently. At Ise in Japan, the principal shrine buildings are torn down and rebuilt on an adjoining plot every twenty years, in new cypress, to the same plan. This has been done more than sixty times since the seventh century. Nobody in Japan thinks that the shrine is twenty years old. Its identity is taken to lie in the form, the site, and the unbroken practice of the carpenters. European conservation long took the opposite view and prized original material above all, so that a restored cathedral was thought to have lost something a ruin kept. In 1994 an international meeting of conservators at Nara, prompted by cases like Ise, agreed that authenticity cannot be judged by one fixed standard and must be understood within each culture. The United States Navy keeps a wooden frigate of 1797, the Constitution, in commission, and only a small fraction of her timber is original. She is still the same ship in the eyes of the law.
這個謎題在真實的制度裡不斷上演,而不同的文化用不同的方式解決它。在日本的伊勢,主要的神宮建築每二十年就拆掉,在相鄰的空地上用新的檜木、照同樣的規制重建。從七世紀以來,這已經做了六十多次。在日本,沒有人認為這座神宮只有二十年的歷史。它的同一性被認為在於形制、地點,以及匠人從未中斷的技藝傳承。歐洲的文物保存長期採取相反的看法,把原始材料看得高於一切,所以人們認為,一座修復過的大教堂失去了某種廢墟還保有的東西。1994 年,一場在奈良召開的國際文物保存會議,在伊勢這類案例的推動下,達成了共識:真實性不能用單一固定的標準來判斷,必須放在各個文化之內來理解。美國海軍讓一艘 1797 年的木造巡防艦「憲法號」保持現役,而她的木料只有一小部分是原件。在法律眼中,她仍然是同一艘船。
07The ship you are 你就是那艘船
The reason the puzzle has lasted is that it is about us. A human body exchanges matter with its surroundings continuously. Most of the atoms in it are replaced within a few years, though some cells, including most of the neurons in the cerebral cortex, last a lifetime. If matter were the standard of identity, the person who was promised something ten years ago would no longer exist to collect it, and the person who committed a crime could not be punished. We hold each other to promises and debts across decades, and so in practice we have all taken the side of form and continuity. Whether we are entitled to is the subject of later lessons on the self.
這個謎題之所以流傳至今,是因為它談的就是我們。人的身體不斷地跟周遭交換物質。體內大部分的原子在幾年之內就被替換掉了,雖然有些細胞,包括大腦皮質裡大多數的神經元,會存續一輩子。如果材料是同一性的標準,那麼十年前被許下承諾的那個人,就不復存在、無從兌現了;犯了罪的那個人,也無法受罰。我們隔著幾十年,仍然要彼此對承諾與債務負責;所以在實踐上,我們全都站到了「形式與連續性」這一邊。至於我們有沒有資格這樣做,是後面談「自我」的幾課的主題。
Zhuangzi has an image for the unease this causes. A man hides his boat in a ravine and thinks it safe, “yet at midnight a strong man carries it off on his back, and the sleeper knows nothing of it.” The strong man is change. One reading of the passage is that nothing stays hidden from it for even a night, and that the boat we find in the morning has already ceased to be the boat we hid.
對於這件事引起的不安,莊子有一個意象。一個人把船藏在山谷裡,以為很牢靠,「然而夜半有力者負之而走,昧者不知也」。那個有力者就是變化。這段話的一種讀法是:沒有任何東西能躲開它,連一夜都躲不過;我們早上找到的那艘船,已經不是我們藏起來的那一艘了。
Thought experiment · 思想實驗
Try it: replace the planks 親手做一次:把木板換掉
A 3D ship of seventy parts. Replace them one at a time, or let the years pass, and say when you think it stops being Theseus’s ship. When nothing original is left, rebuild the old planks on the shore and decide which of the two is his.
一艘由七十個零件組成的 3D 船。一次換一個,或者讓歲月自己過去;你覺得它在哪一刻不再是特修斯的船,就說出來。等到原件一塊不剩,把舊木板在岸上重組起來,再決定這兩艘哪一艘才是他的。
Drag to turn · 拖曳旋轉 Scroll or pinch to zoom · 滾輪/雙指縮放
This 3D model needs WebGL, which this browser does not support. The questions below can still be answered.
這個瀏覽器不支援 WebGL,無法顯示 3D 模型;下方的問題仍然可以作答。
Which one is his? 哪一艘是他的?
Two ships now exist. Which is the ship of Theseus?
現在有兩艘船。哪一艘是特修斯的船?
You are with Aristotle and with Locke on living things: a thing is its organization and its unbroken history. The difficulty is ship B. Had the planks been removed all at once, cleaned, and reassembled, everyone would call the result the same ship. Why should doing it slowly, with a stand-in holding the place, make a difference?
你跟亞里斯多德站在一起,也跟談生物時的洛克站在一起:一樣東西就是它的組織結構與它未曾中斷的歷史。困難在船 B。假如那些木板是一次全部拆下、清理、再組回去,每個人都會說那是同一艘船。為什麼慢慢地做、中間有一個替身佔著位置,就會有差別?
You hold that a thing is what it is made of. Then you must say when the ship in the water stopped being Theseus’s. If it was at the first plank, nothing survives any repair. If it was at some later plank, which one, and why that one?
你主張一樣東西就是構成它的材料。那麼你必須說出,水上那艘船是在什麼時候不再是特修斯的。如果是在換第一塊木板的時候,那麼任何東西都撐不過任何一次修補。如果是在後來的某一塊,是哪一塊?為什麼是那一塊?
One ship cannot be in two places, so read strictly this is a contradiction. It becomes coherent if a ship is a thing spread out in time. Then there are two ships, which shared all of their early stages and have now parted. The cost is that on the day Theseus sailed there were already two ships under him, exactly coinciding.
一艘船不可能在兩個地方,所以照字面讀,這是矛盾的。如果船是一個在時間中展開的東西,這個答案就說得通了:那麼有兩艘船,它們共用了全部的早期階段,現在分開了。代價是:特修斯航行的那一天,他腳下就已經有兩艘完全重合的船。
You hold that once we know where every plank went, nothing is left to know, and “same ship” is a label we apply for our purposes. This dissolves the puzzle for ships. Ask yourself whether you are willing to say the same about a person, including yourself. Derek Parfit was. Most people find that they are not.
你主張:一旦我們知道每一塊木板去了哪裡,就沒有剩下什麼可知道的了;「同一艘船」是我們依自己的目的貼上去的標籤。這樣一來,船的謎題就化解了。問問你自己:對一個人,包括你自己,你願不願意說同樣的話?帕菲特願意。多數人發現自己不願意。
Standard form · 標準形式
The argument, laid out 論證攤開來
Hobbes’s version can be set out as an inconsistent set of claims, each of which is hard to give up. A solution has to say which one goes. Click a step to see what can be said against it.
霍布斯的版本可以攤開成一組互不相容的主張,每一個都很難放棄。一個解法必須說出該放棄哪一個。點任何一步,看看別人可以怎麼反對它。
Primary text · 原典
In their own words 原典怎麼說
The Greek source for the puzzle is a single sentence in a biography. An Indian text of similar age asks the same question about a chariot and gives a definite answer.
這個謎題的希臘文出處,是一部傳記裡的一個句子。一部年代相近的印度文獻,對一輛車問了同樣的問題,並且給了明確的答案。
Plutarch, Life of Theseus 23; Saṃyutta Nikāya 5.10 普魯塔克《特修斯傳》第 23 節;《相應部》5.10 · Plutarch in the Dryden translation revised by A. H. Clough (public domain); the Pāli verse in our own translation
…they took away the old planks as they decayed, putting in new and stronger timber in their place, insomuch that this ship became a standing example among the philosophers, for the logical question as to things that grow; one side holding that the ship remained the same, and the other contending that it was not the same.
……舊木板一朽壞,他們就拆掉,換上新的、更堅固的木料;以致於這艘船在哲學家當中成了一個現成的例子,用來討論關於「會生長的東西」的邏輯問題:一方主張船還是同一艘,另一方堅稱它已經不是同一艘了。
The phrase “things that grow” shows what the philosophers were really arguing about. The Growing Argument was an old puzzle about living things: if a creature is its matter, then whenever it takes in food it becomes a different creature, and nobody ever grows. The ship was useful because it changes slowly and in plain view. Plutarch does not tell us who was right, and he does not seem to think he needs to. (“Insomuch that” means “to such a degree that.”)
「會生長的東西」這個詞組,顯示了哲學家們真正在爭的是什麼。「生長論證」是一個關於生物的古老謎題:如果一個生物就是它的材料,那麼每當牠攝取食物,牠就成了另一個生物,結果是沒有誰曾經長大。這艘船之所以好用,是因為它變得慢,而且變化看得見。普魯塔克沒有告訴我們誰對,他似乎也不覺得有這個必要。(insomuch that 的意思是「到了……的程度」。)
Just as, when the parts are assembled, there is the word “chariot,” so, when the aggregates are present, there is the convention “a being.”
譬如眾分和合,而有「車」這個名稱;同樣地,諸蘊存在時,就有「眾生」這個世俗的說法。
The Pāli is: yathā hi aṅgasambhārā, hoti saddo ratho iti; evaṃ khandhesu santesu, hoti sattoti sammuti. Two words carry the doctrine. Sadda, “word,” says that “chariot” is a name applied to assembled parts. Sammuti, “convention,” says the same of a living being. This is the fourth answer above, stated some two thousand years before Hobbes and applied without hesitation to persons. The monk Nāgasena later used the same chariot to instruct the Greek king Milinda.
巴利原文是:yathā hi aṅgasambhārā, hoti saddo ratho iti; evaṃ khandhesu santesu, hoti sattoti sammuti。有兩個詞承載了這個教義。sadda,「名稱」,說的是「車」只是加在組合起來的零件上的一個名字。sammuti,「世俗、約定」,對有情眾生說了同樣的話。這就是上面的第四個答案;它比霍布斯早了大約兩千年就被提出來,並且毫不猶豫地用在人身上。後來那先比丘用同一輛車,來教導希臘裔的彌蘭王。
Both sides · 正反兩面
Objections and replies 反駁與回應
This is a dispute about a word. Once we know what happened to each plank, there is nothing left to argue about, and people who go on arguing are confused.
這是一場關於字詞的爭論。一旦我們知道每一塊木板發生了什麼,就沒有什麼可爭的了;還在爭的人是搞糊塗了。
For a ship this may be right, and it is the fourth answer. But identity has consequences that words do not. Who owns the vessel, who is liable for its debts, whether a promise made to its captain still binds: these depend on which ship is which. And when the same reasoning is turned on persons, the conventionalist must say that whether I will exist tomorrow is a matter of how we choose to speak. Some accept that. It is not a trivial thing to accept.
對一艘船來說,這也許是對的,而它就是第四個答案。但同一性有字詞所沒有的後果。這艘船歸誰所有、誰要為它的債務負責、對它的船長許下的承諾是否仍然有約束力:這些都取決於哪一艘是哪一艘。而當同樣的推理轉到人身上時,約定論者就必須說:我明天存不存在,取決於我們選擇怎麼說話。有人接受這一點。接受它並不是一件輕鬆的事。
The puzzle arises only for artifacts. Living things and persons have a real principle of unity, a life or a mind, and so it does not touch them.
這個謎題只發生在人造物上。生物與人有真正的統一原則——一個生命,或一個心靈——所以它碰不到他們。
Locke thought so about organisms, and it is true that nobody collects a creature’s discarded cells and builds a rival from them. But the division of an amoeba, or the imagined case of a brain whose two halves are transplanted into two bodies, reproduces Hobbes’s structure exactly: one original, two continuers, each with a good claim. The puzzle follows wherever a thing can have two successors.
洛克對生物體是這麼想的;而且確實沒有人會去蒐集一個生物丟棄的細胞,用它們造出一個對手。但是一隻變形蟲的分裂,或者想像中「一個腦的兩半被分別移植到兩個身體」的情況,把霍布斯的結構原封不動地重現了:一個原物,兩個延續者,各自都有很好的理由。一樣東西只要可能有兩個後繼者,這個謎題就跟到哪裡。
If nothing is strictly the same from one moment to the next, responsibility collapses. No one could be blamed, thanked, or held to a contract.
如果沒有任何東西從一個時刻到下一個時刻嚴格地保持同一,責任就崩潰了。沒有人可以被責備、被感謝,或被要求履行契約。
This does not follow. Responsibility needs a relation between the earlier agent and the later one that is close enough and of the right kind: continuity of memory, character, and intention. It does not need an unchanging core. We already work this way, holding people more or less responsible as they are more or less connected to what they did. Whether continuity without identity is really enough is argued in lesson A13.
這推不出來。責任需要的是先前的行為者與後來的行為者之間,有一種夠緊密、而且種類正確的關係:記憶、性格與意圖的連續。它並不需要一個不變的核心。我們本來就是這樣運作的:一個人跟他做過的事連結得多或少,我們就要他負多或少的責任。至於「有連續而沒有同一」是不是真的夠,留到 A13 那一課討論。
Terms of art · 哲學術語
The vocabulary of the subject 這門學問的用語
Gk. ta meta ta physika ‘the books after the Physics’
The study of what exists and of its most general features: identity, change, time, cause.
研究什麼存在、以及存在物最普遍的特徵:同一、變化、時間、因果。
Being one and the same thing.
是同一個東西。
Being exactly alike, as two copies of a book are.
一模一樣,就像同一本書的兩本。
L. persistere ‘to continue steadfastly’
A thing’s continuing to exist through time and change.
一樣東西經歷時間與變化而繼續存在。
Gk. meros ‘part’
The theory of parts and wholes.
關於部分與整體的理論。
L. transire ‘to go across’
The property of a relation such that if it holds from A to B and from B to C, it holds from A to C.
關係的一種性質:如果它在 A 與 B 之間成立,在 B 與 C 之間也成立,它就在 A 與 C 之間成立。
The view that objects are extended in time and have temporal parts, as they have spatial parts.
主張物體在時間中延展,有時間上的部分,就像有空間上的部分一樣。
L. conventio ‘agreement’
Here, the view that questions of identity are settled by our decisions about how to speak.
在這裡指:同一性的問題,由我們「怎麼說話」的決定來解決。
Advanced English · 高級英文
Words and phrases worth keeping 值得帶走的字與片語
They replaced the timber, insomuch that the ship became a standing example.
他們更換木料,以致於這艘船成了一個現成的例子。
Both sides have a case.
雙方都有道理。
Not one splinter that Theseus touched is left.
特修斯碰過的木頭,連一根碎片都不剩。
A replica is a different thing from the original.
複製品跟原物是兩樣東西。
Hobbes added a twist that turned an old puzzle into a hard one.
霍布斯加了一個轉折,把古老的謎題變成難題。
It seems arbitrary to say that neither is the original.
說兩艘都不是原船,似乎很武斷。
Few can live with that conclusion.
很少有人受得了那個結論。
The fourth answer is the most deflating.
第四個答案最洩氣。
The puzzle is acted out in real institutions.
這個謎題在真實的制度裡不斷上演。
We hold each other to promises across decades.
我們隔著幾十年,仍然要彼此對承諾負責。
Reading check · 理解測驗
Did it land? 讀懂了嗎
1. What is the difference between numerical and qualitative identity?
2. What does Hobbes’s addition to the puzzle introduce?
3. On the view that a thing is its matter, which is the ship of Theseus?
4. What does the rebuilding of the Ise shrine illustrate?
5. According to the nun Vajirā’s verse, what is a “chariot”?
Write · 你怎麼想?
Choose an object you own that has been repaired or partly replaced over the years: a bicycle, a house, a pair of shoes. Is it the same one? Say which standard you are using.
選一樣你擁有、多年來修過或部分換過的東西:腳踏車、房子、一雙鞋。它還是同一個嗎?說出你用的是哪一種標準。
Which of the four answers did you choose in the exercise, and what would you say to someone who chose a different one? About 150 words.
在練習裡,你選了四個答案中的哪一個?對選了別的答案的人,你會說什麼?大約 150 個英文字。
An organization you belong to has changed all its members since it was founded. In what sense is it the same organization? Does your answer differ from your answer about the ship?
你所屬的某個組織,從創立到現在,成員已經全部換過。它在什麼意義上還是同一個組織?你的答案跟你對那艘船的答案一樣嗎?
Dharma and the West · 佛法與西方哲學
A view from the Dharma 佛法怎麼看
Buddhist philosophers met this puzzle early and took a clear position on it. In The Questions of King Milinda, the monk Nāgasena asks the king how he came, and the king says by chariot. Is the pole the chariot? The axle? The wheels? Is it all of them heaped together? Is it something apart from them? To each the king must answer no. “Chariot,” Nāgasena concludes, is a designation in common use, applied in dependence on the parts, and “Nāgasena” is a designation of the same kind, applied in dependence on a body, feelings, perceptions, volitions, and consciousness. No separate thing answers to either name.
佛教哲學家很早就遇上了這個謎題,並且對它採取了明確的立場。在《彌蘭王問經》裡,那先比丘問國王是怎麼來的,國王說坐車來的。那麼,轅是車嗎?軸是車嗎?輪是車嗎?是它們全部堆在一起嗎?還是在它們之外另有一個東西?每一問,國王都只能答「不是」。那先的結論是:「車」是一個通用的名稱,依於這些零件而施設;「那先」也是同一類的名稱,依於色、受、想、行、識而施設。這兩個名字,都沒有一個獨立的東西與之對應。
This is the fourth answer, conventionalism, and Buddhism accepts the consequence that Western conventionalists often resist: it applies to me. The tradition distinguishes two levels. Conventionally there are ships, chariots, and persons, and it is true to say that this is the shrine founded thirteen centuries ago. Ultimately there are only the parts and their relations, arising and passing in dependence on one another. Abhidharma philosophers went further and held that the parts themselves last only a moment, so that every thing is a ship of Theseus whose planks are replaced continuously. Asked whether the one reborn is the same as the one who died, Nāgasena gives the answer that fits the ship as well: neither the same nor another (na ca so na ca añño). He compares it to a flame that burns through the night. It is one fire in the ordinary sense, though no part of it lasts (Dharma and the West, D2 and D16).
這就是第四個答案,約定論;而佛教接受了西方的約定論者常常抗拒的那個後果:它適用於「我」。這個傳統區分兩個層次。就世俗而言,有船、有車、有人;說「這就是一千三百年前創建的那座神宮」,是真的。就勝義而言,只有那些部分以及它們之間的關係,彼此依待著生起、滅去。阿毘達磨的哲學家走得更遠,主張連那些部分本身也只存續一剎那;所以每一樣東西都是一艘特修斯之船,它的木板不斷地在更換。有人問:再生的那個人,跟死去的那個人是同一個嗎?那先給的答案,用在那艘船上也一樣貼切:「非一亦非異」(na ca so na ca añño)。他拿燒了一整夜的火焰來比喻:就平常的意思說,那是同一把火,雖然它沒有任何一部分是持續的(佛法與西方哲學 D2、D16)。
Go further · 延伸
People and reading 人物與延伸閱讀
- Plutarch, Life of Theseus, in Plutarch’s Lives, the Dryden translation revised by A. H. Clough ↗The ship is a single sentence; the rest is a good story. 那艘船只佔一句話;其餘是個好故事。
- John Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, Book II, chapter 27 ↗On the identity of masses, plants, animals, and persons. 談物質團塊、植物、動物與人的同一性。
- The Questions of King Milinda, translated by T. W. Rhys Davids (1890), Book II, chapter 1The chariot, and “neither the same nor another.” 車喻,以及「非一亦非異」。
- Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, “Identity Over Time” and “Material Constitution” ↗
- The Nara Document on Authenticity (1994)Three pages on why the answer differs between cultures. 三頁,談為什麼答案因文化而異。