The Buddha said there is no self, and he also said “I” and spoke of persons, their deeds, and their rebirths. The two truths are the tradition’s account of how both can be right. Why Kant’s two standpoints and the physicist’s two tables come close, where each falls short, and how to stop a listener from hearing “conventional” as “false.” 佛陀說沒有我;他也說「我」,也談人、人的行為與人的再生。二諦,就是這個傳統對「兩者怎麼可能都對」的說明。康德的兩個立足點、物理學家的兩張桌子,為什麼很接近?各自差在哪裡?又該怎麼讓聽眾不把「世俗」聽成「假的」?
D10 Dharma and the West · 佛法與西方哲學Emptiness and Mind · 空與心Advanced · 高級about 30 min
二諦
dve saccāni Pāli satya-dvaya Sanskritthe two truths
The verdict · 判定
Closest: Kant, for whom the world of experience is empirically real and not real in itself. Wilfrid Sellars’s two images of the world are closest to the older Buddhist version, in which the chariot is conventional and its parts ultimate. The likeness to Kant ends at the ultimate. For Kant it is a thing in itself that we can never know. For Nāgārjuna the ultimate truth is knowable, and it is nothing over and above the conventional: it is the fact that conventional things are empty.
中文翻譯Every paragraph has a Chinese translation. Tap 中譯▾ under a paragraph to open that one, or use Show Chinese · 顯示中譯 at the top to open them all.每一段都有中譯:點段落下方的「中譯」只開那一段,或按上方的「顯示中譯」一次全部打開。
1 · What the Dharma says · 佛法怎麼說
How to say “I” without a self 沒有「我」,怎麼說「我」
The problem appears in the earliest texts. The Buddha taught that no self is to be found, and he went on using the words everyone uses. A deity asked whether a monk who has reached the goal would still say “I speak” and “they speak to me.” He would, the Buddha answered. “Skillful, understanding the world’s labels, they’d use these terms as mere expressions.” Elsewhere, after listing the ordinary names for things, he says: “These are the world’s common usages, definitions, expressions, and descriptions, which the Realized One uses to communicate without getting stuck on them.” The nun Vajirā gave the classic image when Māra tried to unsettle her with questions about who made this being. “When the parts are assembled we use the word ‘chariot’. So too, when the aggregates are present ‘sentient being’ is the convention we use.”
The early schools turned this into a doctrine of two kinds of statement. Some of the Buddha’s words describe things as they are finally analyzed: aggregates, sense bases, moments of feeling. Others use the names of wholes: a person, a chariot, an army. Statements of the second kind are true by convention. They are useful and correct in their place, and what they name can be resolved into the items of the first kind. The Buddha himself warned against confusing the two registers. A person misrepresents him, he said, who “explains a discourse in need of interpretation as a discourse whose meaning is explicit,” or the reverse. On this version the ultimate is what is left when analysis is finished.
Nāgārjuna kept the two truths and changed what the second one is. “The Buddhas teach the Dharma by relying on two truths: the conventional truth of the world, and the truth of ultimate meaning. Those who do not understand the distinction between the two truths do not understand the real meaning of the profound teaching.” His analysis did not stop at the parts. The parts are empty too, and no final layer of real things is reached. The ultimate truth about a chariot is that neither it nor its parts have own-nature. So the ultimate is no second world behind this one. It is the way this one is. He added a rule about order: “Without relying on the conventional, the ultimate cannot be attained. Without attaining the ultimate, nirvana cannot be attained.” The commentary gives the reason. The ultimate has to be spoken of, and all speech is conventional.
The Western tradition’s first and most influential two-level picture is Plato’s. There is the changing world that the senses show us, and there is the world of Forms that reason grasps, and the second is more real. The prisoners in the cave take shadows for things, and the philosopher climbs out to see the originals. Many Western readers assume that the Buddhist two truths are a version of this, with emptiness or nirvana in the place of the Forms and ordinary life as the shadows. The structure is reversed. Plato’s higher level contains the things that most fully exist, and each has a fixed nature. Nāgārjuna’s ultimate truth is that nothing has such a nature, and it is a truth about the things of this world, with no other location. A student who leaves the cave in Plato’s story arrives somewhere else. One who understands the two truths has not gone anywhere.
Kant held that space, time, and the order of causes belong to the way our minds take in the world. Within experience they are fully real. He maintained “the empirical reality of space in regard to all possible external experience, although we must admit its transcendental ideality,” that is, “that it is nothing, so soon as we withdraw the condition upon which the possibility of all experience depends.” This is close to the Madhyamaka formula: conventionally existent, ultimately empty. Both deny that the world as we find it exists in its own right, and both refuse to call it an illusion. They separate over the second level. Kant placed a thing in itself behind appearances and said that its nature “is quite unknown to us.” Nāgārjuna placed nothing behind them. He held that the ultimate can be known directly, and that what is known is the absence of anything standing behind.
The physicist Arthur Eddington began a famous book by saying that he was writing at two tables: the solid, colored one of everyday life and the scientific one, mostly empty space with electric charges rushing about. The American philosopher Wilfrid Sellars made the contrast into a problem for philosophy. We have a manifest image of the world, in which there are persons who think, intend, and are responsible, and a scientific image, in which there are particles and fields. The task is to see how both can be held together. This matches the early Buddhist two truths almost exactly. The chariot and the person belong to the manifest image, and the ultimately real items are the ones a finished analysis would list. Sellars and the Abhidharma also agree that persons belong to the first image, and that this does not make talk of persons dispensable. They differ from Nāgārjuna in the same way. Sellars held that in describing what there is, science is the measure. Nāgārjuna held that the scientific image, like any other, is a conventional truth, and that no description reaches things with own-nature.
Who is closest, and where the likeness ends 誰最接近,相似到哪裡為止
Two Buddhist doctrines go by the name of the two truths, and each has its own nearest neighbor. The early version, in which wholes are conventional and their final constituents ultimate, is closest to Sellars and to scientific reduction generally. Any modern reader who says that a table is “really” atoms holds a two-truths view of that kind. The Madhyamaka version is closest to Kant, for whom the world is real for experience and not real in itself. Plato, who is usually the first comparison to come to mind, is the furthest of the three.
The likeness to Kant ends at three points. He has an unknowable something behind appearances, and Nāgārjuna has no such thing. He thinks the human mind is fixed in its forms and cannot see otherwise, and the Buddhist path is a training by which the ultimate comes to be seen. His two standpoints are a result in the theory of knowledge, and the two truths are a teaching device with a use. The Buddha spoke of persons to people who needed to hear about conduct and consequence, and of aggregates and emptiness to those ready to look into what a person is. The purpose of keeping both is that neither nihilism nor attachment to things follows. Kant wanted to show what we can know. Nāgārjuna wanted a way of speaking truthfully to everyone without confirming anyone’s clinging.
Yes, conventionally, and that is the only way anything is real是;依世俗而真實。而任何東西都只能以這種方式真實
Real as a way of speaking作為一種說法而真實
A lesser reality次一等的真實
Empirically real在經驗上真實
Indispensable for persons and norms對人與規範來說不可或缺
Can the second be known?第二層可以被認識嗎?
Yes, by insight可以;靠觀慧
Yes, by analysis可以;靠分析
Yes, by reason可以;靠理性
No不可以
Yes, by science可以;靠科學
How are the two related?兩層是什麼關係?
One world; the second is how the first exists一個世界;第二層就是第一層存在的方式
The first reduces to the second第一層化約為第二層
Copy and original摹本與原物
One world under two standpoints一個世界;兩個立足點
To be joined in one view有待結合成一個看法
5 · The step the Dharma takes further · 佛法多走的一步
No shortcut past the conventional 繞不過世俗
The first further step is the rule of order. Western two-level views generally treat the lower level as something to get beyond: out of the cave, behind the appearances, down to the particles. Nāgārjuna says that the ultimate is reached only by relying on the conventional, and the reason is practical. The path is made of conventional things: words, teachers, precepts, kindness to particular people. A student who announces that conduct is merely conventional and so does not matter has misunderstood both truths at once. The teaching anticipates him. Because actions and results hold conventionally, and conventional holding is the only kind there is, they hold in the fullest sense available. The lessons on emptiness and on the four corners reached the same point by other routes.
The second step is that the two truths collapse the distance between the goal and the starting point. If the ultimate is the emptiness of this world and no other realm, then awakening is a change in how this world is seen. Nāgārjuna states the consequence in a verse that startled his readers: “Between nirvana and the world there is not the slightest difference. Between the world and nirvana there is not the slightest difference.” The commentary explains that both are empty and unarisen, so that no line can be drawn between them. He does not mean that ordinary confusion is already awakening. The Chinese and Japanese schools built much on this verse, and it gave the Mahāyāna its characteristic confidence that practice is done in the middle of ordinary life. It also explains why the bodhisattva does not leave. On Plato’s picture the one who gets out has a reason not to come back. On this one there is nowhere else to be.
In English “conventional” suggests something arbitrary, and “ultimate” suggests something higher and better. Together they tell the listener that Buddhism has a real truth and a pretend one, and that serious people concern themselves with the first. Start by repairing “conventional.” Money is the best example. A banknote is paper, and its value exists only because people treat it as valuable. No one concludes that money is unreal or that it does not matter whether you have any. Its value is conventional and entirely real in its effects. Persons, promises, and nations are like that. Then say what the ultimate truth is: the fact that this is how such things exist. It is the same things, correctly understood.
The Buddha taught that there is no self, and he still said “I.” The two truths explain how both are right.
佛陀教導說沒有我;而他仍然說「我」。二諦解釋了兩者怎麼都是對的。
Conventional truth is like money: it exists by agreement, and it is completely real in what it does.
世俗諦就像錢:它靠約定而存在;而它所起的作用是完全真實的。
The ultimate truth is not about another world. It is about how this one exists.
勝義諦講的不是另一個世界。它講的是這個世界怎麼存在。
Kant said the world is real for experience and not real in itself. Nāgārjuna agreed, and added that nothing is hidden behind it.
康德說:世界對經驗而言是真實的,本身則不是真實的。龍樹同意;並且補了一句:它的背後並沒有藏著什麼。
Nāgārjuna said that you cannot reach the ultimate without relying on the conventional. Ethics is where the path starts, and it is never left behind.
龍樹說:不依靠世俗,就到不了勝義。倫理是這條道路開始的地方;而它從來不會被拋在後面。
When someone says “that’s only conventional,” ask what else there is for a thing to be.
當有人說「那只是世俗的」的時候,問他:一樣東西除此之外還能是什麼?
Phrases to avoid 要避開的說法
“Relative truth and absolute truth.” 「相對的真理與絕對的真理。」
“Absolute” brings in God or a hidden reality. Say “conventional” and “ultimate,” and explain both.
「絕對」把上帝或者某個隱藏的實在帶了進來。要說「世俗」與「勝義」;兩個都要解釋。
“Conventional truth is illusion.” 「世俗諦是幻象。」
Then the precepts are illusion too. Say that it is how things exist and function.
那麼戒也成了幻象。要說:它是事物存在與起作用的方式。
“Ultimately, nothing matters.” 「究竟來說,什麼都不要緊。」
Mixes the two truths. “Mattering” is conventional, and conventionally things matter a great deal.
這是把兩個諦攪在一起了。「要緊」是世俗層次的事;而在世俗上,事情非常要緊。
“Enlightened people are beyond good and evil.” 「覺悟的人超越了善惡。」
The Buddha kept the precepts until he died. Seeing the ultimate does not cancel the conventional.
佛陀持戒直到去世。看見勝義,並不取消世俗。
Three languages · 三語對照
The vocabulary, in Chinese, Pāli, Sanskrit, and English 術語:中文、巴利文、梵文、英文
中文
Pāli
Sanskrit
English
二諦
dve saccāni
satya-dvaya
the two truths
世俗諦
sammuti-sacca
saṃvṛti-satya
conventional truth
勝義諦(第一義諦)
paramattha-sacca
paramārtha-satya
ultimate truth
世間言說
loka-vohāra
loka-vyavahāra
the world’s common usage
假名(施設)
paññatti
prajñapti
designation
了義
nītattha
nītārtha
of explicit meaning
不了義
neyyattha
neyārtha
in need of interpretation
阿毘達磨
abhidhamma
abhidharma
the systematic analysis of experience into its constituents
法
dhamma
dharma
here: a basic constituent of experience
自性
sabhāva
svabhāva
own-nature
物自身
—
—
Kant’s thing in itself
輪迴・涅槃
saṃsāra, nibbāna
saṃsāra, nirvāṇa
the round of rebirth; its ending
Reading check · 理解測驗
Did it land? 讀懂了嗎
1. What did the Buddha say about an awakened monk’s use of the word “I”?
2. What does Vajirā’s verse compare a sentient being to?
3. How did Nāgārjuna change the meaning of ultimate truth?
4. Where does the likeness between Kant and Nāgārjuna end?
5. What rule of order does Nāgārjuna give?
Write · 你怎麼講?
Name three things in your life that exist “by convention” in the way money does, and say what makes each of them real in its effects.
說出你生活裡三樣像錢那樣「依約定而存在」的東西;並且說明是什麼使它們各自在作用上是真實的。
Someone tells you: “Nothing is ultimately real, so why keep promises?” Write a reply of five sentences using the two truths.
有人對你說:「究竟來說沒有任何東西是真實的;那為什麼要守信?」用二諦,寫一段五句話的回應。
Describe your desk, or your hand, as Eddington’s two tables: once in everyday terms and once in scientific ones. Then add a sentence on whether either description is the true one.