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Philosophers · 哲學家 · The 1800s

John Stuart Mill 彌爾 · J. S. Mill

A child raised as an experiment in education, who broke down at twenty, rebuilt himself with poetry, and wrote the classic defenses of utility, liberty, and the equality of women.
一個被當成教育實驗養大的孩子;二十歲時崩潰,靠著詩把自己重建起來,然後寫下了為效益、自由與女性平等辯護的經典。

Born 出生
May 20, 1806, Pentonville, London
Died 去世
May 1873, Avignon, France
Education 教育
At home, by his father James Mill; never attended school or university
Employment 職業
East India Company, London, 1823–1858; Member of Parliament, 1865–1868
Main works 主要著作
A System of Logic (1843); On Liberty (1859); Utilitarianism (1863); The Subjection of Women (1869)
Collaborator 合作者
Harriet Taylor Mill (1807–1858)

中文翻譯Every paragraph has a Chinese translation. Tap 中譯▾ under a paragraph to open that one, or use Show Chinese · 顯示中譯 at the top to open them all. 每一段都有中譯:點段落下方的「中譯」只開那一段,或按上方的「顯示中譯」一次全部打開。

Life · 生平

A life in three scenes 三幕人生

The experiment 那場實驗

James Mill, a Scottish journalist and a disciple of the reformer Jeremy Bentham, believed that the mind at birth is a blank and that education can make of it whatever it chooses. He decided to prove it on his eldest son. “I have no remembrance of the time when I began to learn Greek,” John Stuart Mill wrote. “I have been told that it was when I was three years old.” Latin followed at eight, with geometry and algebra. By twelve he had read most of the Greek and Latin classics and was set to logic, and at thirteen he went through a complete course of political economy on daily walks with his father, writing up each lesson the next morning. He was kept from other children. He was not allowed holidays, lest the habit of work be broken. He reckoned afterward that the method had given him an advantage of a quarter of a century over his contemporaries.

詹姆斯・彌爾是蘇格蘭出身的記者,也是改革家邊沁的信徒;他相信心靈在出生時是一片空白,而教育可以隨意把它造就成任何樣子。他決定在自己的長子身上證明這一點。約翰・史都華・彌爾寫道:「我不記得自己是什麼時候開始學希臘文的。有人告訴我,那是在我三歲的時候。」八歲接著學拉丁文,還有幾何與代數。到十二歲,他已經讀過大部分的希臘與拉丁經典,並且被安排去學邏輯;十三歲時,他在每天跟父親的散步當中上完了一整套政治經濟學,隔天早上再把每一課寫成筆記。他被隔離在別的孩子之外。他不准放假,免得工作的習慣被打斷。他後來估算,這套方法讓他比同時代的人領先了四分之一個世紀。

At fifteen he read Bentham, and the principle of utility, he said, gave unity to everything he knew: he now had a creed, a philosophy, a religion. At seventeen he was briefly arrested for handing out pamphlets on birth control in the poor streets of London, and in the same year he followed his father into the London office of the East India Company, where he would work for thirty-five years, drafting dispatches to India in the mornings and writing philosophy in the time left over.

十五歲時,他讀了邊沁;他說,效益原則為他所知的一切帶來了統一:他現在有了一個信條、一套哲學、一種宗教。十七歲時,他因為在倫敦的貧民街道散發節育傳單而短暫被捕;同一年,他跟著父親進了東印度公司的倫敦辦公室。他在那裡工作了三十五年,早上起草發往印度的公文,用剩下的時間寫哲學。

The crisis 危機

In the autumn of 1826, when he was twenty, the machine stopped. “It occurred to me to put the question directly to myself: ‘Suppose that all your objects in life were realized; that all the changes in institutions and opinions which you are looking forward to, could be completely effected at this very instant: would this be a great joy and happiness to you?’ And an irrepressible self-consciousness distinctly answered, ‘No!’ At this my heart sank within me: the whole foundation on which my life was constructed fell down.” He had been trained to analyze and had never been taught to feel, and he now feared that the habit of analysis had worn his feelings away. For months he went through his work mechanically and told no one.

1826 年秋天,他二十歲,那台機器停了。「我想到要直接問自己這個問題:『假設你人生的一切目標都實現了;你所期盼的制度與輿論上的一切改變,就在這一刻全部達成:這對你會是莫大的喜悅與幸福嗎?』而一種壓抑不住的自我意識清清楚楚地回答:『不會!』聽到這裡,我的心往下一沉:我的人生賴以建造的整個地基垮了。」他被訓練成會分析,卻從來沒有人教他感受;而他現在害怕,分析的習慣已經把他的感情磨光了。有好幾個月,他機械地做完工作,沒有告訴任何人。

The first relief came by accident. He was reading the memoirs of the French writer Marmontel and came to the passage describing the death of the author’s father, and he found himself in tears. He was not, then, “a stock or a stone.” Two years later he read Wordsworth, whose poems gave him what he called a culture of the feelings. He drew two lessons that shaped everything he later wrote. Happiness cannot be had by aiming at it: “Ask yourself whether you are happy, and you cease to be so.” And a good life needs the cultivation of the inner person as well as the reform of outward circumstances. He never renounced Bentham’s principle. He spent the rest of his life enlarging what it meant.

最初的紓解是意外來的。他正在讀法國作家馬蒙泰爾的回憶錄,讀到描寫作者父親去世的那一段,發現自己流下了眼淚。那麼,他並不是「一塊木頭或石頭」。兩年後,他讀了華茲華斯;那些詩給了他他所謂的「情感的陶冶」。他得出了兩個教訓,塑造了他後來寫的一切。幸福不能靠瞄準它而得到:「問問自己是否幸福,你就不再幸福了。」還有:美好的人生既需要改革外在的環境,也需要培養內在的人。他從來沒有背棄邊沁的原則。他用餘生去擴大它的意思。

Harriet, and Parliament 海莉耶,以及國會

In 1830 he met Harriet Taylor, who was twenty-two, married, and the mother of two children. For twenty years they maintained an intense friendship that scandalized London and that her husband tolerated. Two years after his death they married, in 1851, and Mill signed a formal protest against the legal powers that marriage gave him over her. She died at Avignon in 1858. He bought a house within sight of the cemetery and spent half of every year there. On Liberty appeared the following year, dedicated to her as “the inspirer, and in part the author, of all that is best in my writings.”

1830 年,他認識了海莉耶・泰勒;她二十二歲,已婚,是兩個孩子的母親。有二十年之久,他們維持著一段熱烈的友誼,使倫敦社會譁然,而她的丈夫容忍了。她丈夫去世兩年後,他們在 1851 年結婚;彌爾簽署了一份正式的抗議書,反對婚姻在法律上賦予他支配她的種種權力。1858 年,她在亞維儂去世。他買下了一棟看得見墓園的房子,每年有一半的時間住在那裡。《論自由》在隔年出版,題獻給她:「我著作中一切最好的東西的啟發者,而且有一部分是其作者。」

In 1865 the voters of Westminster elected him to Parliament, though he had refused to campaign or to spend any money. In 1867 he moved that the word “man” in the Reform Bill be replaced by “person,” which would have given women the vote. The motion was lost, and seventy-three members voted for it, far more than anyone expected. The Subjection of Women followed in 1869. He died at Avignon in 1873 and was buried beside Harriet. He had agreed, the year before, to stand as godfather to the infant son of a friend. The child was Bertrand Russell.

1865 年,西敏選區的選民把他選進了國會,儘管他拒絕競選、也拒絕花一分錢。1867 年,他提案把《改革法案》裡的 man(男人)一詞換成 person(人),這樣就會讓女性有投票權。提案沒有通過,卻有七十三位議員投了贊成票,遠多於任何人的預期。《女性的屈從地位》接著在 1869 年出版。1873 年,他在亞維儂去世,葬在海莉耶身旁。去世的前一年,他答應當一位朋友剛出生的兒子的教父。那個孩子是羅素。

  1. 1806Born in London生於倫敦
  2. 1809Begins Greek開始學希臘文
  3. 1823Joins the East India Company進東印度公司
  4. 1826The mental crisis精神危機
  5. 1843A System of Logic《邏輯體系》
  6. 1851Marries Harriet Taylor與海莉耶・泰勒結婚
  7. 1859On Liberty《論自由》
  8. 1863Utilitarianism《效益主義》
  9. 1867Moves votes for women提案給予女性投票權
  10. 1873Dies at Avignon卒於亞維儂

The central idea · 核心觀念

Happiness, with a difference of kind 幸福,但有種類之別

Bentham had held that pleasure is the only good, that pleasures differ only in amount, and that “pushpin is as good as poetry” if it pleases as much. Critics called this a philosophy fit for swine. Mill kept the foundation: “actions are right in proportion as they tend to promote happiness, wrong as they tend to produce the reverse of happiness,” and the happiness that counts is that of everyone affected, extended “so far as the nature of things admits, to the whole sentient creation.” What he changed was the account of happiness. Pleasures differ in kind as well as in amount, he argued, and the test is the verdict of those who have known both. No one who has enjoyed the exercise of intelligence, feeling, and conscience would give them up for any quantity of an animal’s contentment. “It is better to be a human being dissatisfied than a pig satisfied; better to be Socrates dissatisfied than a fool satisfied. And if the fool, or the pig, is of a different opinion, it is because they only know their own side of the question.”

邊沁主張:快樂是唯一的善;各種快樂只有量的差別;只要帶來的快樂一樣多,「圖釘遊戲跟詩一樣好」。批評者說這是一套只配給豬的哲學。彌爾保留了地基:「行為之為對,與它們增進幸福的傾向成比例;行為之為錯,與它們產生幸福之反面的傾向成比例」;而算數的幸福,是每一個受影響者的幸福,並且「在事物的本性所容許的範圍內,推及一切有感知的受造物」。他改變的,是對幸福的說明。他論證:快樂不只有量的差別,也有種類的差別;而檢驗的標準,是那些兩種都體驗過的人的判決。凡是享受過運用智性、情感與良知的人,都不會為了任何數量的動物式的滿足而放棄它們。「做一個不滿足的人,勝過做一隻滿足的豬;做不滿足的蘇格拉底,勝過做一個滿足的傻瓜。如果那個傻瓜或那隻豬有不同的意見,那是因為他們只知道問題屬於自己的那一面。」

On Liberty applies the same standard to society. A people is happiest in the long run, Mill argues, when its members are free to form their own opinions and try their own ways of living, because truth is found only by the collision of opinions and character is formed only by choice. He proposes one principle to mark the limit of what a society may force on a person: the only purpose for which power can rightfully be exercised over anyone against his will is “to prevent harm to others.” A person’s own good is not a sufficient warrant. And silencing an opinion is always a loss: “If all mankind minus one, were of one opinion, and only one person were of the contrary opinion, mankind would be no more justified in silencing that one person, than he, if he had the power, would be justified in silencing mankind.”

《論自由》把同一個標準用在社會上。彌爾論證:一個民族,當它的成員可以自由形成自己的意見、嘗試自己的生活方式時,長遠來看是最幸福的;因為真理只有在意見的碰撞中才找得到,品格只有在抉擇中才能形成。他提出了一條原則,用來標出社會可以強加於個人的限度:違背一個人的意願而對他行使權力,唯一正當的目的是「防止對他人的傷害」。一個人自己的好處,並不是充分的理由。而讓一個意見噤聲,永遠是一種損失:「假如全人類除了一個人之外意見都相同,只有那一個人持相反的意見;那麼人類要使那個人噤聲,並不比那個人(假如他有那個權力)要使全人類噤聲,更有道理。」

It is better to be a human being dissatisfied than a pig satisfied; better to be Socrates dissatisfied than a fool satisfied.做一個不滿足的人,勝過做一隻滿足的豬;做不滿足的蘇格拉底,勝過做一個滿足的傻瓜。
J. S. Mill, Utilitarianism, chapter 2
His answer to the charge that utilitarianism is a doctrine worthy only of swine. 他對「效益主義是只配給豬的學說」這項指控的回答。

The strongest objection · 最強的反駁

Can it protect the one from the many? 它保護得了那一個人,不受多數人侵害嗎?

If right action is whatever produces the most happiness on the whole, then it seems that an innocent person may be sacrificed whenever enough others would gain. A sheriff could hang a man he knows to be innocent in order to prevent a riot in which many would die. A surgeon could take one patient’s organs to save five. Mill’s own principle of liberty appears to be in danger from his principle of utility, since a majority might be made happier by silencing a hated minority. He saw the problem and gave the last and longest chapter of Utilitarianism to it. Justice, he argues, is the name for those rules that protect the most vital of human interests, security above all, and a society that kept them only when convenient would lose the security that makes every other good possible. Rights are to be respected almost without exception because that policy has the best results.

如果對的行為就是在總體上產生最多幸福的行為,那麼,只要有夠多的別人會得利,一個無辜的人似乎就可以被犧牲。一位警長可以為了避免一場會死很多人的暴動,吊死一個他明知無辜的人。一位外科醫師可以取走一位病人的器官去救五個人。彌爾自己的自由原則,看來正受到他的效益原則的威脅,因為讓一群被憎恨的少數噤聲,也許會使多數人更幸福。他看到了這個問題,並且把《效益主義》最後也最長的一章用來處理它。他論證:「正義」是那些保護人類最攸關緊要的利益(尤其是安全)的規則的名稱;一個只在方便的時候才遵守這些規則的社會,會失去使其他一切善成為可能的那份安全。權利幾乎應該毫無例外地被尊重,因為這個方針有最好的結果。

Critics have never been satisfied. If the rules matter only for their results, then in the rare case where breaking one would certainly do more good and never be discovered, the theory has no reason left to keep it, and those are the cases that test a theory. A second objection concerns the higher pleasures. If some pleasures are better in kind, apart from how pleasant they are, then something other than pleasure is making them better, and Mill has quietly given up the view that pleasure is the only good. A third fastens on his proof. “The sole evidence it is possible to produce that anything is desirable,” he wrote, “is that people do actually desire it.” But “visible” means can be seen, and “desirable” means ought to be desired, and from the fact that people want something it does not follow that they should.

批評者始終沒有被滿足。如果規則之所以要緊,只是因為它們的結果,那麼在那個罕見的情況裡:違反一條規則確定會帶來更多的善,而且永遠不會被發現,這個理論就再也沒有理由遵守它了;而檢驗一個理論的,正是這種情況。第二個反駁針對較高級的快樂。如果有些快樂在「種類」上比較好,與它們有多令人愉快無關,那麼就有快樂之外的某個東西使它們比較好;而彌爾已經悄悄放棄了「快樂是唯一的善」這個看法。第三個反駁緊抓著他的證明。他寫道:「要證明任何東西是可欲的,所能提出的唯一證據,就是人們實際上欲求它。」然而,visible(可見的)的意思是「能夠被看見」,desirable(可欲的)的意思卻是「應該被欲求」;而從「人們想要某樣東西」這個事實,推不出他們應該想要它。

How we know · 史料

Whose books are they? 這些書是誰的?

Mill’s life is known chiefly from his Autobiography, written in the 1850s and revised until his death. It is a remarkable document and a partial one. It is organized as the history of an education. His mother is not mentioned in it, and his eight younger brothers and sisters, most of whom he taught, hardly appear. Of Harriet Taylor he writes in terms that readers have always found extravagant. He credits her with a mind greater than his own, and says of their later books that “the most valuable ideas and features in these joint productions… originated with her.” Scholars have disagreed ever since about how literally to take him. Little survives in her hand beyond an essay on the enfranchisement of women and her letters. Some hold that he exaggerated out of love and grief. Others point out that the works written during and just after their marriage, On Liberty above all, differ in spirit from what he wrote before, and that the assumption that a woman could not have contributed much is the very prejudice the two of them wrote against.

彌爾的生平,主要是靠他的《自傳》為人所知;這本書寫於 1850 年代,一直修訂到他去世。它是一份非凡的文獻,也是一份片面的文獻。它被組織成「一場教育的歷史」。書裡沒有提到他的母親;他的八個弟妹(其中多數是他教的)也幾乎沒有出現。談到海莉耶・泰勒,他用的措辭,讀者向來覺得過度。他說她的心智比他自己的更偉大;談到他們後期的著作,他說:「這些共同作品裡最有價值的觀念與特色……是源自於她。」此後,學者們對於該多照字面相信他,一直意見分歧。她親筆留下的東西,除了一篇論女性參政權的文章與她的書信之外,所剩無幾。有些人認為,他是出於愛與悲傷而誇大了。另一些人指出:在他們婚姻期間與剛結束之後寫成的作品(尤其是《論自由》),在精神上與他先前寫的不同;而「一個女人不可能有多少貢獻」這個預設,正是他們兩人寫書所反對的那種偏見。

Dharma and the West · 佛法與西方哲學

Mill and the Buddha 彌爾與佛陀

Mill’s morality and the Buddha’s have the same scope. Both take the suffering and happiness of every sentient being to count, both refuse to give one’s own a special weight, and Mill’s phrase “the whole sentient creation” could stand as a translation of the Buddhist wish that all beings be happy. Mill’s crisis also taught him something the Buddha had taught. Happiness sought directly recedes. Mill’s remedy was to aim at some other end and find happiness “by the way.” The Buddhist analysis goes a step further and says why: the seeking is itself the craving that makes contentment impossible.

彌爾的道德與佛陀的道德,範圍是相同的。兩者都把每一個有情眾生的苦與樂算進去,兩者都拒絕給自己的苦樂特別的分量;而彌爾那句「一切有感知的受造物」,可以當作佛教「願一切眾生安樂」這個願望的翻譯。彌爾的危機也教了他一件佛陀教過的事:直接去追求的幸福會後退。彌爾的對治,是去瞄準某個別的目的,「順路」找到幸福。佛教的分析多走了一步,說出了為什麼:那個追求本身,就是使滿足成為不可能的渴愛。

They differ on three points. Mill judges an act by its results and holds that “the motive has nothing to do with the morality of the action.” The Buddha judges it by the intention, and a harmful result that was not intended is not an unwholesome deed. Second, Mill adds happiness across persons, so that a loss to one can be outweighed by gains to many. Buddhist ethics has no such sum. It asks each agent not to harm, and the bodhisattva who gives his body to feed a tigress gives his own and no one else’s. Third, they mean different things by happiness. Mill’s higher pleasures are the satisfactions of a cultivated mind, and they remain satisfactions of desire. The Buddha ranks above all of these a happiness that comes from the ending of desire. Whether that is a still higher pleasure on Mill’s scale or something the scale cannot measure is a good question to put to both (Dharma and the West, D18).

他們在三點上不同。彌爾依結果來評判一個行為,並且主張「動機與行為的道德性無關」。佛陀依意圖來評判;一個並非出於意圖的有害結果,不算是不善業。第二,彌爾把不同的人的幸福加總起來,所以一個人的損失可以被許多人的獲益抵過。佛教倫理沒有這樣一筆總帳。它要求每一個行動者不去傷害;而那位捨身飼虎的菩薩,捨的是自己的身體,不是別人的。第三,他們說的「幸福」不是同一個意思。彌爾的高級快樂,是一個有教養的心靈的滿足,而它們仍然是欲望的滿足。佛陀把一種「來自欲望止息」的樂,排在這一切之上。那是彌爾的量尺上一種更高的快樂,還是這把量尺量不了的東西?這是一個值得同時向兩人提出的好問題(佛法與西方哲學 D18)。

慈mettā / maitrīloving-kindness
思cetanāintention
樂sukhahappiness, ease
離欲virāgathe fading of desire

Terms of art · 哲學術語

Words that come with him 跟著他一起來的詞

principle of utility效益原則

Actions are right in proportion as they tend to promote happiness.

行為之為對,與它們增進幸福的傾向成比例。

higher pleasures高級快樂

Pleasures of intellect, feeling, and conscience, which Mill held to be better in kind than bodily ones.

智性、情感與良知的快樂;彌爾主張它們在種類上優於身體的快樂。

harm principle傷害原則

Society may restrain a person only to prevent harm to others.

社會只有為了防止對他人的傷害,才可以約束一個人。

tyranny of the majority多數的暴政

The oppression of individuals by prevailing opinion, which Mill feared more than oppression by governments.

盛行的輿論對個人的壓迫;彌爾對它的恐懼,更甚於政府的壓迫。

rule utilitarianism規則效益主義

The view that we should follow the rules whose general observance has the best results. Often read into Mill.

主張我們應該遵循那些「普遍被遵守時結果最好」的規則。常被認為是彌爾的意思。

naturalistic fallacy自然主義謬誤

G. E. Moore’s name for inferring what is good from what is desired or natural.

摩爾取的名字:從「被欲求的」或「自然的」推論出「善的」。

Reading check · 理解測驗

Did it land? 讀懂了嗎

1. How did Mill change Bentham’s account of happiness?

2. What does the harm principle say?

3. What did Mill conclude from his mental crisis?